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Conventional wisdom has it that copyright is essential to ensure that creative 
efforts will be directed at producing cultural creations of various kinds. Without this or 
some other stimulus, creative talent would be deployed elsewhere in endeavours 
where it will earn proper rewards. In the course of history various techniques have 
been used to create such a stimulus: first mover advantage, secret, favouritism by 
the powerful, employment contracts, pensions, state procurement contracts, state 
subsidies, sponsorships, lotteries, to name just a few.2  
As a stimulus, copyright, which will concern us here, and intellectual property 
generally, are thought to outperform these other techniques. Copyright is meant to be 
granted without discretion once its predefined conditions are fulfilled, is entirely 
decentralised (does not depend on any one person's view of the value of the 
creation) and procures a reward that is a function of how much different consumers 
are willing to pay for the product or service it protects. For this scheme to work, 
copyright holders have to have control over who can use their creation. Without such 
control, consumers would free ride, i.e. consume without paying for it. All cultural 
creations are information goods which can be used by many persons without 
diminishing their utility for anyone else – a feature which economists refer to as 
characteristic of "public goods". Information goods are not naturally scarce in the 
                                                
1  Emeritus Professor of Law, Université de Montréal; Fellow, CIRANO; ejan.mackaay@umontreal.ca . 
2  Mackaay 2013a, 303f. 
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economic sense, though the talent to create them is. 
For physical goods, whose consumption by one person prevents consumption 
by another, control over usage is ensured by some form of "fence" that shuts out 
anyone but the title holders and persons admitted by them. Fences can take a variety 
of forms: ditches, locks, armoured doors, electronic registration for software that 
triggers automatic updating, contractual schemes, etc.3 Where no effective fence can 
be put in place, the objects in question risk being left in open access and hence over-
consumed and under-produced, as the examples of fish in the open sea and 
unpolluted air illustrate. This risk is known as the "tragedy of the commons" following 
Hardin's article of that title.4 
For information goods, "fences" are more difficult to put in place because of 
their "public good" character. Once you share an information good with someone 
else, there is little to stop it from spreading to third persons: copying it is becoming 
ever cheaper and does not deprive the original holder of use. Besides the danger of 
consumers free riding, one must also expect competitors to copy the good and bring 
to market a lower-priced version of it competing with the original, thus undermining 
the client base of the original creator. The two effects combine to lead to a risk of 
shortfall in revenue and hence to a reduced incentive to create: talents would tend to 
be directed elsewere. For this reason it is felt that the law needs to step in to shore 
up the fences as required to create an exclusive right for the original creator and so 
to ensure that more creative work will be forthcoming. 
Raustiala and Sprigman's book under review here confronts this conventional 
wisdom head on.5 It points to a number of industries and activities, such as stand-up 
comics, haute cuisine cooking recipes, databases, in which the absence of a formal 
intellectual property right does not appear to stand in the way of a flourishing and 
innovative industry. In Section I we look at why this works with the informal fences 
specific to these industries.  
Raustiala and Sprigman also discuss the fashion industry, whose importance in 
the US alone is a multiple of that of all cultural industries combined and yet which 
functions without effective intellectual property rights on the fashion designs, and 
indeed with widespread copying amongst competitors. We look at this industry in 
Section II. 
In an Epilogue, Raustiala and Sprigman reflect on the future of the music 
industry, where the internet has led to widespread consumer copying, decried by 
industry spokespersons as "piracy" and as the cause of declining record sales and 
                                                
3  Mackaay 2013, 239f. 
4  Hardin 1968. 
5  Raustiala 2012, 7. The book synthesises arguments developed in earlier papers in 2006 and 2009.  
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the death knell for musical creation ("copying kills creativity").6 Yet evidence shows 
that new music creators and new musical creations appear unabated. We look at this 
in Section III. 
I. Industries with informal fences and no direct formal IP right 
The recipes of haute cuisine. The first phenomenon to be discussed is that of 
haute cuisine. Fine cooking is an industry doing $604 billion in the US alone.7 
Recipes for fine food cannot be directly protected and so can be freely copied. The 
number of eateries is too large for community norms to stop copying, although within 
the narrow community of top chefs, unduly "stealing" someone else's recipes may be 
sanctioned, not very effectively, by blacklisting and denial of access to further 
creations. 8  How then do the best chefs succeed in getting rewarded for their 
creativity? 
Chefs may make their recipes sufficiently sophisticated so as to defy easy 
copying. They also use a variety of other strategies. The essential point of them is 
that what the consumer buys is not so much the recipe of a chef, as the total 
experience of consuming the dish in the restaurant where the chef prepares it or 
supervises its preparation. The recipe is "fenced in" by being tied to the restaurant 
where it is served. The restaurant itself is protected more easily by its physical 
location, its trademark and (under the American Trademark Act of 1946) its "trade 
dress", i.e its appearance, decoration and so on, constituting the "look and feel" of 
the restaurant. The Chef's reputation can be used as a booster: if chefs publish their 
recipes, this may draw people to the restaurant, where they may vary their own 
recipes served there.  
Essentially what happens here is that an information good which is not itself 
easily fenced in is tied to another good that is. Rewards for creativity are collected by 
"selling" the two jointly. Essentially the same formula is used to collect on the creation 
of new formulas for (alcoholic) cocktail drinks. 
Stand-up comedians9. For stand-up comedians, fresh jokes and routines are 
the stock in trade. They must be invented; once told to an audience they can be 
freely retold and lose their value quickly as they are repeated. So the driving force in 
this trade is the ability to invent or get one's hands on fresh jokes. This makes it 
imperative to stop competing comedians from copying these jokes for their own 
shows ("plagiarism") 
                                                
6  Raustiala 2012, 171; Levine 2011 . 
7  Raustiala 2012, 58, quoting numbers given by the (US) National Restaurants Association. 
8  See also Fauchart 2008. 
9  Raustiala 2012, 105 ff. 
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How is "plagiarism" dealt with? Within the small community of stand-up 
comedians, there is a norm against mounting a show consisting of other persons' 
jokes. If one person is transgressing the norm by stealing a particular other 
performer's material, the latter may in the first instance take this up with the 
plagiariser. Should they be unable to settle their differences, community sanctions of 
attacks on reputation (with third persons who could employ the performers for their 
shows) and refusals to deal may follow. 
The industry as a whole is subject to great pressure to come up continually with 
new jokes and routines. Within the small community of stand-up comedians, fencing 
against outright plagiarism is successfully accomplished by community norms.  
Sports strategies.10 In any sport, competition for the top consists in part in 
inventing new strategies that take the opponent by surprise and allow one to win. 
This advantage is temporary because the frustrated opponents or their supporters 
will figure out the magic formula and implement it, possibly improved or "tweaked", as 
well. So the protection required to cash in on one's creativity stems here from (1) 
keeping the formula secret, where that is possible (2) first mover advantage for as 
long as it takes opponents to figure it out. On the whole, competitive sports are quite 
innovative. Competition for the prizes drives continual innovation in strategies. 
Type fonts11. Until a century and a half ago, typefaces were extremely costly to 
develop (in lead metal, by professionals) and equally costly to copy. As a result, there 
were few of them and protection was not a problem. Advances in technology made it 
possible in the early twentieth century to photograph a font and then to transpose it 
onto metal and thence onto lead type letters. Copying became less costly. With the 
advent of computer, the cost of designing new typefaces came down radically as did 
the cost of copying them (a click away). Copying typefaces was no longer an activity 
restricted to professionals, but could be done by anyone with a computer. 
Ease of copying creates an "open access" space and might signal the need for 
some form of fencing to secure reward for the efforts involved in designing a type 
font. Legal protection was not available because of the functional character of type 
fonts, excluded in copyright legislation. No effective private form of fencing arose, 
probably due to the huge community of potential copyists. Did this mean the death 
knell for creativity in typefaces? Not at all. Raustiala and Sprigman report12 current 
estimates that put the total number of typefaces in circulation at a quarter of a million. 
How can this work? In part, it is due to the cost of developing a new typeface being 
radically reduced by computer technology. This weighs all the more as most new 
fonts are minor variations ("tweaks", as the authors call them) on existing ones. Fonts 
                                                
10  Raustiala 2012, 126 ff. 
11  Raustiala 2012, 145 ff. 
12 Raustiala 2012, 150. 
 MACKAAY – IS KNOCKOFF A KNOCKOUT? 5 
 
are often provided with computer operating systems or design software (Adobe), in 
which case tied sales logic operates to reward the creators. 
Financial innovations13. The financial industry develops new financial "products" 
(derivatives) and new computerised ways of managing financial portfolios. The latter 
are patentable in the US following a Court of Appeals decision in State Street Bank 
and Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc.14 There has been debate about the 
advisability of allowing patents on software, but, according to the authors, allowing it 
has not changed much within the financial industry. New financial products, in any 
event, cannot be protected by intellectual property. So how is innovative spirit 
rewarded here? The authors contend that industry relies on two mechanisms: trade 
secret within very large firms (backed-up by protective clauses in employment 
contracts) and first mover advantage. 
Databases15. These are huge electronic collections of materials organised for 
easy search and retrieval. Generally they are regularly updated with new material so 
as to keep current. Databases are not protected by copyright in the US and in 
Canada, where court decisions have judged that the facts they assemble do not pass 
the test of originality required for such a right to arise.16 In both cases, the contents 
of telephone directories were considered to be out of bounds for copyright and in the 
public domain. By contrast, the European Union has adopted a Directive obliging 
member states to enact legislation protecting databases with a sui generis right less 
encompassing than copyright.17  
Significantly, the lack of copyright or similar protection did not spell the (slow) 
death of the American database industry, as industry spokespersons feared. On the 
contrary, the database industry is growing in North America and stagnant in Europe. 
The database industry in part protects itself against copying by clauses in the 
contracts with users. Users will want to subscribe to have on-line round-the-clock 
access to up-to-date material. As users log on, the validity of their contract granting 
them access is checked on the fly. Behind this apparently simple procedure lies an 
important logic: because copying cannot be prohibited, the industry protects itself by 
continuing to innovate in order to keep customers happy.  
Altogether, the brief survey of different non-copyright industries by Raustiala 
                                                
13  Raustiala 2012, 155 ff. 
14  149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), leave to appeal to the US Supreme Court denied 119 S Ct 851 (1999). 
15  Raustiala 2012, 162 ff. 
16  US: Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Company, 499 U.S. 340 (1991), 113 L.Ed.2d 358, 18 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1275; Canada: Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American Business Information Inc., (1994) 58 
C.P.R. (3d) 10 (CF); [1998] 2 CF 22 (CFA); leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied. 
17  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection 
of databases. OJ L 77, 27.3.1996, p. 20–28;  
http://old.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1996:077:0020:0028:EN:PDF   
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and Sprigman shows that where the law is not available to shore up fences thought 
necessary for innovators to get their reward, innovation does not necessarily grind to 
a halt. The innovators protect themselves by a variety of informal fences : first-mover 
advantage, secret, community norms, contractual norms and electronic fencing. In 
some instances, they seek their reward by innovating faster than competitors, 
thereby ensuring niche market superior revenues until competitors catch up, which 
may take a while. Competition, rather than stifling innovation by shaving away the 
innovator's reward, may on the contrary be the very condition that stimulates it most.  
II. The fashion industry 
In a 2006 paper, Raustiala and Sprigman reported that the fashion industry then 
sold more than more than $750 billion worth of apparel in the US alone.18 This is 
more than the cultural and software industries combined. The fashion industry is 
continuously innovating, very competitive and highly segmented, with a high end, 
where designer dresses sell for prices in the six figures, through upscale ready-to-
wear designs to mass produced confection and cheap knock-offs. Many firms 
operate within this industry; older ones disappear and new ones appear all the time. 
Fashion designs are not protected by copyright nor another intellectual property 
right in most countries. What is remarkable about the industry is that it is vibrant in 
spite of widespread and very rapid copying or imitation: an attractive and possibly 
trend-setting dress shown at the Oscar ceremonies may be copied and imitated in 
short order to appear in less expensive form offered to a different segment of the 
apparel market. The industry itself has adjusted to this rapid copying phenomenon 
and is as innovative and competitive as any. 
In an earlier age, upscale American clothiers attempted to protect their designs 
from cheap knock-offs by setting up a wholesalers coalition that would only sell to 
retailers if they refrained from selling cheaper knock-offs and maintained certain 
prices for the coalition's upscale wares. Inspectors for the coalition would visit retail 
outlets to ensure the conditions were observed and, if not, would trigger blacklisting 
of the infringer. By the late 1930s, the Federal Trade Commission looked into the 
scheme and brought suit for violation of antitrust legislation. In 1941, the Supreme 
Court of the United States declared the scheme in violation of anti-trust laws.19 
End of creative fashion design? Not at all. The industry changed its business 
model to stress the value of owning a designer dress or one that is part of a fashion 
trend set by a conspicuous designer dress. While the trend is building up, it becomes 
desirable for the fashion conscious to join the movement. Once the trend has 
                                                
18  Raustiala 2006, 1693. 
19  Fashion Originators’ Guild v. FTC, 312 US 457 (1941). 
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reached all corners of the market, it loses its appeal and is replaced by a newer 
trend. Freedom to copy accelerates the spreading of a trend (and the demise of the 
preceding one) and thereby promotes innovation in the industry. This in itself will 
promote sales for the industry as a whole. It is what Raustiala and Sprigman call the 
"piracy paradox".20 
In this set-up, having one's design copied by knock-off operators may be, 
paradoxically, a quality signal for fashion designers. It may bring them new wealthy 
customers for new possibly trend-setting designs. Fashion operators may actually 
encourage copying in as much as it contributes to setting a new trend. But the real 
money is made with the lower-priced mass produced knock-offs of these designs, 
when the trend takes off. In a sense, the haute couture serves as advertising for the 
knock-offs. Of course, it is important to keep the reputation for top-level design 
separate from that relating to lesser-priced designs. The fashion industry operators 
may be active in all segments of the market, but under different brand names. Hence, 
whilst no intellectual property right is available for the designs, the trademarks 
protecting brands in different segments in the market are extremely important and 
strictly enforced. The haute couture designer may sell its own designs in slightly 
modified form and under a different brand name in knock-off markets, where it faces 
competitors doing the same thing. 
The fashion industry's business model appears to work quite well. In a graph 
displayed at p. 46 of their book, Raustiala and Sprigman show how the price of top-
level women's dresses has doubled over the period of 1998 till 2010, whereas for all 
other segments of the market the price of dresses has remained relatively stable or 
declined. To explain the phenomena we observe here, Barnett and co-workers have 
proposed a model in which low level copying could lead to a stable equilibrium in the 
industry, with high revenues and lively competition.21  
What should be noted about the fashion industry is that, whilst highly innovative 
and fiercely competitive, it is less concentrated than the cultural industries (book, 
music, film), where there is formal IP protection for creations. Could IP protection, 
when too strong, lead to higher concentration within the industry than would be 
desirable for maximising welfare? 
III. The music industry22 
Musical creations are normally subject to copyright, automatically granted upon 
                                                
20  Raustiala 2012, 38, 44. 
21  Barnett 2010. 
22  Raustiala 2012, 213 f. (Epilogue). 
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creation in countries that have adhered to the Berne Convention.23 The traditional 
business model provided that revenue for musical creations would be secured 
through royalties on physical recordings or printed sheet music and through 
admission charges to live performances. Production of physical records involved 
substantial capital outlays, first for the recording (in specialised studios, with 
specialised personnel) and then for the printing of the records and for advertising and 
distribution amongst an extensive network of retailers. Until a few decades ago these 
"fences" would be secure enough to guarantee such revenue as the work could fetch, 
without much concern for unauthorised copying or recording. Copying such as it was 
resulted in copies of lesser quality – and hence desirability – than the original. 
The advent of digital recordings of music and of broadband internet radically 
changed this setting. Music could be shared amongst consumers simply and without 
quality loss. As a result it became quite common. The fences that were effective in 
the earlier period no longer worked so well. The watershed, in the eyes of the 
industry, was the advent, in 1999, of Napster, the system that allowed consumers 
worldwide to find and share music peer-to-peer in a radically simplified way.24 The 
formula was wildly successful with consumers. Record sales, which in 1999 stood at 
a high of $20 billion, no doubt boosted by the recent conversion from records to CDs, 
steadily declined from thereon to $7 billion, in 2011, which is below the level attained 
in 1985.25  
The industry did not hesitate to attribute the decline to unauthorised file sharing 
or "piracy". Whether this causality can be proven empirically is disputed in the 
scientific literature.26 Quite possibly shared music whets the appetite and leads to 
purchase of records. Be that as it may, the industry reasoned that an unauthorised 
copy represents a lost sale and that lost sales lead to lost revenue and in turn to 
lessened incentive to create. It sued the initiators of Napster and was successful in 
shutting the service down in 2001.27 This led to the development of peer-to-peer 
sharing software without a central server and harder to trace: Aimster, Grokster, 
Gnutella and others. The industry sued their operators as well and won again. But 
consumers kept sharing files. So the industry sued individual consumers who shared 
files, and it won these battles too, obtaining cease-and-desist orders.28 As this still 
did not stop file sharing, the industry then tried to enlist Internet service providers to 
                                                
23  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698 
24  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster  
25  Lunney 2014a, text at nt 21 f.; Lunney 2012, 2; Raustiala 2012, 216. 
26  Rob 2006; Peitz 2006; Liebowitz 2006; Oberholzer-Gee 2007, 2010; Waldfogel; for Canada, Andersen 
2010, contradicted by Barker 2012. 
27  Lunney 2014a, text at nt 9 f.; Carrier 2012. 
28  Lunney 2014a, text at nt 11 f. 
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shut out customers who it deemed to be engaging in piracy activity.  
All this did not, however, make a serious dent in file sharing amongst 
consumers. Based on Cisco data, Lunney estimates file sharing in 2012 to amount to 
the equivalent of 7.5 billion CDs per month, with the expectation that it would triple 
over the next four years.29  
If revenue from record sales is down, one may expect artists to change their 
business model and turn to other sources of revenue.30 They could self-publish and 
sell on the internet (all the more successfully as the internet allows one to reach the 
"long tail"31); rely on sales by convenient and simple on-demand services, initiated by 
Apple's iTunes32 in 2001 and now offered by Amazon, Spotify, Netflix for films and 
many others; live performances, where access can be more easily fenced in and for 
which the records act as advertising; 33  merchandising; 34  endorsement deals; 
contributions from fans wishing to favour particular artists specifically35; or they could 
exit music creation altogether. 
There is evidence that revenues from these sources have gone up.36 We do not 
know directly whether additional income from these sources is sufficient to offset the 
decline in record sales, and neither do we know whether the total amount of music 
consumed has increased. But if industry doomsayers are correct, one would expect 
reduced incentive to lead to fewer new creators entering the market and fewer new 
creations being offered. On these we do have data. 
As regards new albums being brought out, it should be noted that the cost of 
recording music and of distributing it has dramatically gone down. Scale economies 
are no longer a conditio sine qua non: home recording with ordinary software does 
the job.37 This in itself would tend to increase the number of new albums brought out. 
As regards new artists attempting entrance into the highly competitive world of 
music, revenues from creative endeavour are distributed in a very skewed manner, 
with top performers earning fortunes, some others earning a living and the tail end of 
the distribution losing their shirt.38 By all accounts, it is an "unfair lottery". One must 
                                                
29  Lunney 2014a, text at nt 18 f.; see also Oberholzer-Gee 2010. 
30  Darling 2014 documents such a shift for the adult entertainment industry. 
31  Anderson 2007. 
32  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ITunes ; Raustiala 2012, 220. Apple's iPod and the associated iTunes store 
were a runaway success. They still occupy 75% of the market for paid downloaded music. 
33  Oberholzer-Gee 2010; Lunney 2014a, text at nt 24. 
34  Lunney 2014a, text at nt 9. 
35  Lunney 2009; this paper (25) relates how Stephen King used this method for his book The Plant. 
36  Raustalia 2012, 222. 
37  Raustiala 2012, 215. 
38  Scherer 2001. 
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presume artists attempting entrance into this unfair lottery to be driven by the idea of 
a "pot of gold" if successful.39 If revenue drops as a result of piracy, one may expect 
the pot of gold to be less rich and so its incentive potential to be smaller, and hence 
to see some potential music creators direct their talents elsewhere. In this regard, it 
would be particularly significant to find new creators making hits on first trial, 
outclassing established creators. 
Several field studies have attempted to measure new musical creations in the 
post-Napster era.40 Various dimensions may be relevant. For established artists 
lesser revenue might lead to renewed creative effort, reversing a tendency to 
substitute leisure for work as they raked in revenue earlier.41 If new creations and 
new creators are less numerous, one might expect more musicians to resort to 
producing new renditions of existing success numbers, the so-called "covers".  
The tricky part of the measurement is that, because of widespread copying, one 
cannot rely on sales figures supplied by the industry. Copying is likely to focus most 
on popular hits. In his fieldwork Lunney relied on songs that appeared in the Top 50 
of the Billboard Hot 100, played by radio stations, over the period 1985-2013. Over 
this period the proportion of new artists appearing in the Top 50 with their first 
creation remained relatively constant, 42  as did the proportion of new artists 
appearing on the Top 50 list with a second or later creation.43 
As regards "cover songs", which might be substitutes for original creations 
where incentives are insufficient for the latter, Lunney finds a clear and steady 
decline over the period studied.44 The proportion of new songs in the post-Napster 
area remains relatively constant and in the same range as before Napster.45 And the 
number of new artists appearing on the hit list remains roughly the same between 
pre- and post-Napster, with an increase in very recent years.46 To this it should be 
added that the number of new albums brought out more than doubled between 2000 
and 2007, a third of which appeared as digital albums in 2007.47 
                                                
39  Raustiala 2012, 204; Oberholzer-Gee 2010, 22; Scherer 2001. 
40  See Rob 2006; Waldfogel 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Oberholzer-Gee 2007, 2010; Lunney 2012, 2014a and b. 
41  Leonard Cohen, having been swindled by his manager, had to engage in new creation and new touring 
efforts. These turned out to be extremely successful, in terms of live performance attendance as well as 
record sales, and largely sufficient to wipe out the losses suffered from swindling. Scherer reports that 
Verdi reduced creative effort when, as a result of the introduction of copyright, he could maintain his 
income with less effort. (Scherer 2008, 11). See also Lunney 2014a, 13 for the same substitution effect by 
the contemporary artist Garth Brooks. 
42  Lunney 2014a, Fig. 3. 
43  Lunney 2014a, Fig. 4. 
44  Lunney 2014a, Fig. 5. 
45  Lunney 2014a, Fig. 6. 
46  Lunney 2014a, Fig. 7. 
47  Oberholzer-Gee 2010, 24; see also Waldfogel 2012. 
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Taken together, this evidence suggests that significant new music creation and 
widespread filesharing can coexist.48 In a sense, widespread filesharing might be 
seen as a natural experiment reducing the scope of copyright.49 Looked at this way, 
it suggests that for significant music creation to take place, we do not need as 
extensive a copyright as we now have on paper. In particular, there is little reason to 
think that extending copyright duration from fifty years after the creator's death to 
seventy years has any useful effect in bringing forth more original creations.50 All 
these copyright extensions seem to result from highly successful lobbying by the 
cultural industries in the face of unorganised consumer interests.51 
What a too long lasting copyright does was brought to light in a recent study by 
Heald dealing with the book industry and incidentally with the music industry.52 Heald 
looked at a random sample of 2000 books available on Amazon.com. As expected, 
he found that availability decreased steadily with the age of the book. But books 
published in the United States before 1923 were placed in the public domain. In the 
sample studied, the availability curve took a significant upturn for books originally 
published in the 1850s till 1923. This suggests that copyright prevents republication 
even though there appears to be a market for reissuance of older titles, as 
entrepreneurial initiatives in the public domain reveal. For older music, the availability 
is much better, thanks to Amazon and Youtube amongst others and in part no doubt 
because the pieces are shorter, the conversion simpler and the commercial risk 
smaller.  
Conclusion 
The fields of creative endeavour reviewed here show that where formal 
copyright is not available or is not working as well as hoped, industry participants 
adapt their business model to focus on activities sufficiently "fenced in" for revenues 
to be effectively secured. How this is done, how well it works and how this affects 
competition varies from industry to industry: fashions and trends, community norms, 
first mover advantage, brand name protection, live performances, open content 
(reducing the cost of creation) and other ways. Industry specificity is not normally 
considered in IP law, as it is in competition law.53  
The absence or ill-functioning of IP does not mean the death of creativity. 
                                                
48  Raustiala 2012, 7; Lunney 2014b, 296.  
49  Lunney 2014a, 7; Waldfogel 2011. 
50  Lunney 2012, 19, 23-24; Mackaay 2013b. 
51  Lunney 1996, 629. 
52  Heald 2014. 
53  Hovenkamp 2015. 
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Activities may be reoriented towards forms in which reward can be better ensured. In 
some instances, copying may actually stimulate innovation. In the case of Wikipedia, 
content is made entirely by volunteer effort and is explicitly offered free for copying 
under a creative commons licence. Without any IP protection, it is by far and away 
the most consulted encyclopedia in the world. It competed Microsoft's Encarta 
encyclopaedia, protected by copyright, out of existence.54 
Whether the resulting set-up is optimal as regards reward for existing creations 
as well as openness to future creations, in other words whether we have the optimal 
amount of innovation, is an open question. We know that this involves a trade-off,55 
but reliably measuring the costs and benefits involved has so far eluded us.56 
The studies reviewed here do not authorise the conclusion that we can do 
without IP.57 A recent historical study looks at the creation and performance of 
operas in Italian states between 1780 and 1821, comparing those that introduced 
copyright during Napoleonic occupation to those that did not.58 It finds that the 
copyright states had more and better opera and that composers born elsewhere 
moved to those states. Introducing copyright had a perceptible incentive effect on 
creation there. 
Our review also shows, however, that IP has non-negligible drawbacks. 
Industrial concentration in the cultural industries is higher than in the fashion industry, 
which has no formal IP protection. Industrial concentration makes for effective lobbies 
and one may surmise that the continual extension of copyright in duration and scope 
is the result of lobbying where the forces opposing such extension are dispersed and 
unorganised. Too extensive copyright would lead to lock-up of cultural creations 
beyond what is necessary to motivate the initial creators in the first place. The study 
of the "disappearing" books provides some indication that we have reached this 
stage. 
The studies on the effects of music "piracy" show that music sharing has not 
killed musical creation, quite the contrary. With the cost of creation coming down 
quickly, we have all at once more albums produced, more new creations, fewer 
"covers" and widespread copying. This raises the question of whether what we see is 
the existing distribution formula being questioned and new formulae being explored. 
If intellectual property has a role to play in stimulating innovation, we must find 
ways to prevent lobbying efforts from extending it well beyond this role, where it 
becomes rent-seeking and leads to unnecessary lock-up. As for the duration of 
                                                
54  Raustiala 2012, 185. 
55  Mackaay 2013a, 342-343. 
56  Darling 2014, 708. 
57  Raustiala 2012, 9, 202; Darling 2014, 660; contra: Boldrin 2008. 
58  Giorcelli 2014. 
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copyright, a 14-year term, renewable upon demand, might be a good starting point, 
as The Economist puts it. 59  Raustalia and Sprigman, although insisting that 
intellectual property still has an essential role to play60 and that there are instances 
where "copying is neither benign nor beneficial",61 do not offer precise advice on 
where that role lies and should be enforced. They offer ample evidence that copying 
does not kill creativity and indeed may stimulate it. They document changes in 
business models adopted by those seeking revenues and being unable to stop 
copying. The key to focus on, they insist, is return on innovation, not restrictions on 
copying.62  
  
                                                
59  The Economist 25 January 2003, p. 15; repeated The Economist 2 July 2005, p. 14; and again 8 April 
2010 
60  Raustiala 2012, 203. 
61  Raustiala 2012, 211. 
62  Raustiala 2012, 203. 
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